Washington Supreme Court is Tough on Discovery Violations
Posted: November 25, 2009 Filed under: discovery, Sanctions Leave a comment »In Magana v. Hyundai Motor Am., the Washington Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s $8,000,000 sanction against Hyundai for its discovery violations.
Procedural History
Plaintiff, Magana filed suit against Hyundai claiming that injuries he sustained in a car accident were due to a design defect in his car that allowed the seat to collapse. He requested copies of all complaints and related documents regarding alleged seat back failure on Hyundai products since 1980. Hyundai responded that the request was overly broad and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It then responded that there were no personal injury or fatality lawsuits or claims in connection with the seat or seat back of the Hyundai Accent from 1995-1999. Hyundai also responded to an interrogatory requesting the name and model of all Hyundai vehicles that used the same right front seat as the 1996 Accent that Plaintiff drove. Hyundai responded that the 1995-1999 Accents used the same or substantially similar right from seat, but that no other models did.
At a trial, the jury found Hyundai and the driver of the other car involved in the accident liable for $8,000,000 in damages. Smith and Hyundai appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that an expert’s testimony had been stricken was misleading. A retrial was ordered on the limited issue of liability.
Four months before the retrial, Magana asked Hyundai to update its discovery responses that it had submitted 5 years earlier. Three months before the retrial, Hyundai amended its discovery responses by producing complaints and claims of alleged seat back failure in 1995-1999 Accents and in 1992-1995 Elantras. It also supplemented its interrogatory response stating that the 1992-1995 Elantras had a recliner that was substantially similar to the 1996 Accent. It produced documents of two claims relating to seat back failure. Magana filed a motion to compel all documents it originally requested in 2000. Hyundai objected that the request was too burdensome, but never requested a protective order.
Ultimately, Hyundai produced additional documents regarding 9 reports of seat back failures.
One month before trial, Magana moved for default against Hyundai, arguing it would be impossible to prepare a proper case with the other similar incidents that had just been produced, because evidence was lost due to the delay. An evidentiary hearing was held, and then Hyundai produced the last of its documents 2 weeks before trial. The trial court granted Magana’s motion for default.
Hyundai appealed and the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial.
Supreme Court’s Decision
Magana appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court reinstated the $8,000,000 default judgment. In some discussion that is important to practicing attorney, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Further, the Court stated that if a party objects to discovery, then the party must seek a protective order or respond to the discovery request. The Court found Hyundai willfully violated its discovery obligations since it had initially only searched its legal department and not other departments within the corporation for its records. The Court also held that a lesser sanction, such as postponing the trial date, was inappropriate when (1) the discovery withheld made it difficult to identify potential other similar cases given the passage of time; and (2) the sanction should be serious enough to sanction the willful violations of an international corporation.
Court May Strike Party’s Witnesses for Failure to Comply with Court Ordered Deadlines
Posted: June 29, 2009 Filed under: Civil Rules, Sanctions, Trial, Witnesses Leave a comment »In Blair v. TA-Seattle East #176, Division I of the Court of Appeals held that a court has the authority to strike a party’s witness where there is a “showing of intentional or tactical nondisclosure, willful violation of a court order, or unconscionable conduct.” The failure of a party to meet court ordered discovery deadlines is a presumptively willful violation of the court’s order.
In Blair, the plaintiff disclosed primary witnesses almost 7 weeks after the initial deadline, and 9 days after the deadline for additional witness disclosure. The plaintiff’s disclosures also lacked summaries of expert witnesses testimony and their credentials. Plaintiff’s failure to timely disclose its witnesses was without excuse