Attorney Stung By “Offer of Judgment”
Posted: February 15, 2012 Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: Civil Rules Leave a comment »Even experienced attorneys can be tripped up by some of the more arcane areas of law. Such was the case when the Court of Appeals ordered attorney Amy Hansen to pay an attorneys fees in an employment dispute she had thought she had settled for $7,500.
Paul Lietz, a paralegal and investigator sued his employer Hansen for unpaid wages and claimed attorneys fees under the wage and hour statutes. Hansen submitted an “offer of judgment” offering to allow Lietz to enter a judgment for $7,500 in exchange for dismissing the “claim.” Offers of judgment are allowed by the civil rules and provide that a party can agree that a judgment can be entered against the in the amount set forth on the offer of judgment. If the other side fails to accept the offer of judgment and the eventual judgment in the case is less than the amount offered, then the person making the offer will be considered the “prevailing party, which can shift certain litigation costs back to the party that refused to accept the offer.
In Hansen’s case, Lietz immediately accepted the offer of judgment for $7,500 and presented it to the court asking for an additional $36,000 in attorneys’ fees arguing that because Ms. Hansen’s offer of judgment did not specify that it was in settlement of his attorney’ fees claim, he was entitled to attorneys fees as well as the $7,500 settlement. The trial court was sympathetic to Ms. Hansen’s plight refusing to award fees finding that there was no “meeting of the minds” on the terms of the offer of judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding that under existing case law the failure to specify that the offer of judgment included attorneys fees required the trial court to award fees under the applicable wage and hour statutes.
Offers of judgment are useful tools in litigation allowing a defendant to shift risk and costs to the a plaintiff who demands an unreasonable sum in settlement. However, as noted above, care must be taken in drafting the document correctly, otherwise it can result in unintended consequences and costs.
Contributed by Geoff Bridgman
Supreme Court Announces Insures Must Pay Pro-rata Share of Attorneys Fees When Offsetting PIP Benefits and Failing to Do So May Result in Liability for Bad Faith
Posted: February 15, 2012 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a comment »Earlier this week the Washington State Supreme Court held that an insurance carrier that insures both the at fault driver and the injured plaintiff must reduce any offset for PIP payments by a pro-rata share of plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. Matsyuk et. al. v. State Farm. The result is consistent with a string of other cases beginning with Mahler v. Szucs 135 Wn.2d 398 (1998) and ending with Hamm v State Farm 151 Wn.2d 303 (1998) that have held PIP insures responsible for paying a pro-rata share of attorneys’ fees in a cases involving PIP subrogation or offsets where the insured recovers money from a third party insurance carrier and where insured recover under their own underinsured or uninsured motorist policies. Although the result is not surprising in light of the Mahler line of cases, State Farm had support for its position in the Young v Teti 104 Wn. App. 721 (2001) case. The Supreme Court analyzed Young and overruled it, finding that it was inconsistent with Hamm. In addition, the Court reversed earlier dismissal of bad faith claims against State Farm finding that its refusal to settle the claim unless Ms. Matsyuk settled her PIP claim was sufficient to state a claim for bad faith.
Contributed by Geoff Bridgman
Don’t leave a dead horse in the road…
Posted: July 8, 2010 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a comment »Apparently, in Washington, you best not hit a horse with your car and leave it on the road. A Jefferson County jury awarded $2.7 million to a woman who was injured when she hit the dead horse in the road. The horse was left by a telephone company truck driver who accidentally struck the horse. He did not call or alert anyone to the dead animal in the roadway, or use any of the safety equipment available in his company truck to alert subsequent drivers.
Division I Decision on the Statute of Limitations for PRA Requests
Posted: June 21, 2010 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a comment »The Washington Court of Appeals, Division 1, released a published opinion today in Tobin v. Worden. Under RCW 42.56, the statute of limitations to file suit for a Public Records Act request begins when either (1) the agency last claims an exemption; or, (2) last produces a record on an installment basis. The court held that when the King County Department of Development and Environment Services (DDES) produced a single, redacted document and no other documents, the statute of limitations was never triggered and the requesting party’s PRA claim was not time barred.
Are Administrative Court Records Subject to the PRA?
Posted: March 10, 2010 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a comment »On March 9, 2010, the Washington Supreme Court heard arguments in Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic regarding whether administrative court records are subject to the PRA. The case involves whether the Yakima Herald-Republic was entitled to receive records regarding billing charges by two attorneys appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants. Given the October decision in Koenig v. Federal Way, it seems unlikely that these records will be subject to the PRA, and much more likely that the all court records will be exempt. The Washington Supreme court also blogs on this topic.
Court Records are not Subject to the Public Records Act
Posted: October 16, 2009 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a comment »In Federal Way v. Koenig, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Public Records Act does not apply to court files. David Koenig requested records from the Federal Way Municipal Court regarding correspondence between a then-sitting-judge and the presiding judge. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Nast v. Michels, that the PRA does not apply to court files because the judiciary is not an “agency” within the PRA.
See also the Washington Supreme Court’s blog.
